Suing the Luzerne County Judges

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOELLE ANGELI, :
ALYSON BABER, :
LEE BABER, :
JEREMY BARTZ, :
JOSEPH DRAHUS, :
TINA DRAHUS, : CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
CARL KRUPA II, :
SHIRLEY KRUPA, :
SCOTT MURRAY, :
DANIELLA ORMSBY, :
JUSTIN PUZAK, :
SCOTT SOSNAK, :
DOUGLAS VANKEUREN, III :
:
Plaintiffs :
: CIVIL ACTION-LAW
:
:
:
:
vs. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
:
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, :
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., :
PA CHILD CARE, LLC, :
WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC, : NO.:
VISION HOLDINGS, LLC, :
PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC, :
BARBARA CONAHAN, :
CINDY CIAVARELLA, : JUDGE:
ROBERT K. MERICLE, :
MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., :
ROBERT J. POWELL, :
GREGORY ZAPPALA, : [ELECTRONICALLY FILED]
BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PA, INC., :
SANDRA BRULO, Individually, and in her Official:
Capacity as Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, : :
Defendants :

_________________________________________________/


CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, and files this Class Action Complaint against the Defendants above-named and allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit follows the federal criminal investigation and eventual change of pleas of guilty by defendants Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella. Conahan and Ciavarella are disrobed former elected judges of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. The actions of Conahan and Ciavarella occurred while both disgraced men were acting under the color of law, when they continuously engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the plaintiffs’ civil rights for their own personal profit. These men have committed unthinkable acts against the children of this community for which monetary relief does not seem enough or fair. If this Honorable Court were to follow the Due Process that Conahan and Ciavarella showed our children, the gallows and not money would be the only redress suitable for these disgraceful men.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec.1331, because this action arises under the laws of the United Sates and under 28 U.S.C. Sec.1964(c), because this action alleges violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962, et seq.
2. This Court has venue over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec.1391(b) and (c) and 18 U.S.C. Sec.1965. Upon information and belief, Defendants Powell, Conahan, Ciavarella, PA Child Care, LLC, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Powell Law Group, P.C., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., reside in this Judicial District. Further, as substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims alleged in the Class Action Complaint occurred in this Judicial District.





THE CLASS
3. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. The class is defined as children who, for any amount of time, were placed, housed or lodged by defendant Mark Ciavarella, Jr., in the juvenile detention facilities owned and/or operated by PA Child Care, LLC or Western PA Child Care, LLC, from December 2002 until 2008, and their parents who incurred damages for the placement, housing and lodging of their children at juvenile detention facilities. The children who were placed at such juvenile detention facilities are sometimes referred to herein as “juvenile plaintiffs,” regardless of whether any such person has reached the age of majority.
5. Plaintiffs meet all four (4) requirements under Rule 23(a) such that the District Court should certify this case as a class action lawsuit. Namely: (1) numerosity,
(2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation.
6. First, the proposed class as defined above exceeds hundreds of juvenile plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by Defendants’ conduct as set forth further herein. The class also exceeds hundreds of parents who were required to pay for their children’s unlawful detention. Therefore, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
7. Second, the named plaintiffs share an abundance of questions of law and fact common to the class.
8. Third, the claims or defenses of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of the class so as to assure that the absent class members’ interests will be adequately represented.
9. Fourth, the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. In that regard, the named plaintiffs’ attorneys are qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and the named plaintiffs do not have interests antagonistic to those of the class.
10. Plaintiffs meet all requirements under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.
11. Plaintiffs meet all requirements under Rule 23(b)(2) because the party opposing the class has acted on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
12. Plaintiffs meet all requirements under Rule 23(b)(3) because there are questions of law or fact common to class members which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

THE CLASS PLAINTIFFS

Joelle Angeli
14. Plaintiff Joelle Angeli was a juvenile in 2005. Joelle Angeli has now reached the age of majority.
15. In approximately 2005, Joelle Angeli was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Joelle Angeli to approximately seven months in PA Child Care. After she was finished with PA Child Care, Ciavarella placed her on Probation for a period of approximately 9 months. Prior to Joelle Angeli’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in PA Child Care or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in PA Child Care. Joelle Angeli did not retain a private attorney neither Ciavarella asked or assigned one.
16. After she reached the age of majority, plaintiff Joelle Angeli was required to, and continues to pay for her Probation.

Alyson Baber
17. Plaintiff Alyson Baber was a juvenile in 2003. Alyson Baber has now reached the age of majority.
18. In approximately 2003, Alyson Baber was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Alyson Baber to approximately fifty nine days in Camp Adams. Prior to Alyson Baber’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams.
19. Plaintiff Alyson Baber’s father was required to, and did, pay for Alyson Baber’s stay in Camp Adams.

Lee Baber
20. Plaintiff Lee Baber is the father of Alyson Baber.
21. In approximately 2003, Alyson Baber was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Alyson Baber to approximately fifty nine days in Camp Adams. Prior to Alyson Baber’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams.
22. Plaintiff Lee Baber was required to, and did, pay for Alyson Baber’s stay in Camp Adams.

Jeremy Bartz
23. Plaintiff Jeremy Bartz was a juvenile in 2003 and 2006, Jeremy Bartz has now reached the age of majority.
24. In approximately 2003, Jeremy Bartz was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Jeremy Bartz to approximately two months in Camp Adams. In approximately 2006, Jeremy Bartz was sent to Glen Mills School for a period of 15 months but they kept him there for approximately 30 months, even though Jeremy Bartz was completed with all the programs. At the end of the 30 months he was successfully graduated for Glen Mills School. Prior to Jeromy Bartz’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams and or Glen Mills School or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams and or Glen Mills School. Jeromy Bartz did not retain a private attorney, and asked Ciavarella for a Public Defender his petition and pray for a lawyer was denied.
25. After he reached the age of majority, plaintiff Jeromy Bartz’s mother, a single mother that suffered from depression, was required to, and did pay for Jeromy Bartz’s stay at Camp Adams.

Joseph Drahus
26. Plaintiff Joseph Drahus was a juvenile in 2005. Joseph Drahus has now reached the age of majority.
27. In approximately 2005, Joseph Drahus was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Joseph Drahus, to approximately five months in PA Child Care, after he got released from PA Child Care he was sent to ninety days to Clear Brook Teenage Rehab Institution. Prior to Joseph Drahus’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in PA Child Care or Clear Brook Teenage Rehab Institution, or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in PA Child Care.
28. Plaintiff’s mother Tina Drahus, was required to, and did pay for Joseph Drahus’s stay in
PA Child Care and Clear Brook Teenage Rehan Institution.

Tina Drahus
29. Paintiff Tina Drahus is the mother of Joseph Drahus.
30. In approximately 2005, Joseph Drahus was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Joseph Drahus, to approximately five months in PA Child Care, after he got released from PA Child Care he was sent to ninety days to Clear Brook Teenage Rehab Institution. Prior to Joseph Drahus’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in PA Child Care or Clear Brook Teenage Rehab Institution, or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in PA Child Care.
31. Plaintiff Tina Drahus was required to, and did pay for Joseph Drahus’s stay in PA Child Care and Clear Brook Teenage Rehab Institution.

Carl Krupa II
32. Plaintiff Carl Krupa II was a juvenile in 2006. Carl Krupa II has not reached the age of majority.
33. In approximately 2006, Carl Krupa II was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Carl Krupa II to approximately thirty four days in Camp Adams. Prior to Carl Krupa II court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams. After Camp Adams, Carl Krupa II was placed on Probation for an indefinite period of time.
34. Plaintiff’s parents were required to pay, and did, for Carl Krupa’s stay in Camp Adams.

Shirley Krupa
35. Plaintiff Shirley Krupa is the mother of Carl Krupa II.
36. In approximately 2006, Carl Krupa II was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Carl Krupa II to approximately thirty four days in Camp Adams. Prior to Carl Krupa II court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams. After Camp Adams Carl Krupa II was placed on Probation for an indefinite period of time.
37. Plaintiff Shirley Krupa was required to, and did pay for Carl Krupa II’s stay in Camp Adams.

Scott Murray
38. Plaintiff Scott Murray was a juvenile in 2005. Scott Murray has now reached the age of majority.
39. On or about summer of 2005, Scott Murray was charged with theft from stealing an earring from the Mall. He was sent to the Detention Center in Pittston. Prior to Scott Murray court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in the Detention Center or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in the Detention Center.

Daniella Ormsby
40. Plaintiff Daniella Ormsby was a juvenile in 2005. Daniella Ormsby has now reached the age of majority.
41. In approximately 2005, Daniella Ormsby was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Daniella Ormsby for not paying a fine on a previous case. She spent approximately seven months in PA Child Care. Prior to Daniella Ormsby’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in PA Child Care or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in PA Child Care. After Daniella Ormsby was released from PA Child Care she was placed on Probation and living at a group facility.
42. The State paid for all of Daniella’s stay in Camp Adams due to family’s low income.

Justin Puzak
43. Plaintiff Justin Puzak was a juvenile in 2007. Justin Puzak has now reached the age of majority.
44. In approximately 2007, Justin Puzak was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Justin Puzak. He spent approximately 45 days in Camp Adams, and then sent to Clear Brook for a period of ninety days. Prior to Justin Puzak’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or Clear Brook or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams or Clear Brook.

Scott Sosnak
45. Plaintiff Scott Sosnak was a juvenile in 2007. Scott Sosnak has now reached the age of majority.
46. In approximately 2007, Scott Sosnak was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Scott Sosnak. He spent approximately 30 days in Camp Adams, and then placed on Probation for an indefinite time, where he got off on or about December, 2007. Prior to Scott Sosnak’s court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams.
47. Plaintiff parents were required to, and did pay for Scott Sosnak’s stay in Camp Adams.

Douglas Vankeuren III
48. Plaintiff Douglas Vankeuren III was a juvenile in 2006. Douglas Vankeuren III has not reached the age of majority.
49. In approximately 2006, Douglas Vankeuren III was found to be delinquent. Mark Ciavarella, as judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, sentenced Douglas Vankeuren III. He spent ninety days in Camp Adams. Prior to court proceedings or sentencing, Ciavarella did not disclose in any fashion that he had any conflict of interest, or that he had a financial interest in Camp Adams or that he and Conahan had agreed to place children in Camp Adams. He was supposed to do a special learning support due to the lost of his father, which they placed him on a different educational program. He was diagnosed with post dramatic stress and severe separation anxiety disorder.
50. Douglas Vankeuren III had a Public Defendant which never met or spoke before with the juvenile or his family prior to the day of his sentencing.
51. His social security checks were used to pay the fees for Camp Adams.

THE DEFENDANTS
52. Michael T. Conahan hereinafter (“CONAHAN”) was, at all times relevant hereto, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. Between approximately January 2002 until January 2007, he served as President Judge of Luzerne County. CONAHAN as at all times relevant a President Judge of Luzerne County, Pa. and owner, officer, shareholder, operator, and beneficiary of Defendants Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc. CONAHAN currently resides, before his placement and housing in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in Mountain Top, PA.
53. Mark A. Ciavarella hereinafter (“CIAVARELLA”) was at all times relevant hereto, a Judge on the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pa., and owner, officer, shareholder, operator, and beneficiary of Defendants Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc.
54. Defendant, Robert J. Powell, hereinafter (“POWELL”), is an adult individual who resides at 10 Fox Run Road Drums, Pennsylvania, and at all times relevant was an owner, officer, shareholder, and operator of Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC., Vision Holdings LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., and Powell Law Group, P.C.
55. Defendant Gregory Zappala, hereinafter (”ZAPPALA”), is an adult individual residing at 1212 Cliffview Drive, Monroebille, PA and was at all times relevant an owner, shareholder, officer, and operator of Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC., and Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp.
56. Pa Child Care, LLC, hereinafter (“PACC”) was at all times relevant hereto, a limited liability company authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a registered office address located at 520 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 8581, Reading, Pennsylvania.
57. PACC was at all times relevant hereto, a business entity under the control of POWELL and ZAPPALA.
58. Western PA Child Care, LLC hereinafter (“WESTERN PA CHILD CARE”) was, at all times relevant hereto, a limited liability company authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a registered office address located at 1105 Berkshire Boulevard, Suite 320, Wyomissing, PA.
59. WESTERN PA CHILD CARE was, at all times relevant hereto, a business entity under the control of POWELL and ZAPPALLA.
60. Vision Holdings, LLC hereinafter (“VISION HOLDINGS”) was, at all times relevant hereto, a limited liability company authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a registered office address located in West Hazleton, PA.
61. VISION HOLDINGS was, at all times relevant hereto, a business entity under the control of POWELL.
62. Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC hereinafter (“PINNACLE GROUP”) was, at all times relevant hereto, a limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a registered office address located at 301 Deer Run Drive, Mountain Top, PA.
63. PINNACLE GROUP was at all times relevant hereto owned and operated by Defendants Barbara Conahan and Cindy Ciaverella.
64. Barbara Conahan hereinafter (“BARBARA CONAHAN”) was, at all times relevant hereto, managing agent and/or owner of PINNACLE GROUP. She currently resides in Mountain Top, PA.
65. Cynthia Ciavarella (“CYNTHIA CIAVARELLA”) was, at all times relevant hereto, managing agent and/or owner of PINNACLE GROUP. She currently resides in Kingston, PA.
66. PINNACLE GROUP was, at all times relevant hereto, a business entity under the control of CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
67. Robert Mericle hereinafter (“MERICLE”) was, at all times relevant hereto, an adult and competent individual who currently resides in Harvey’s Lake, PA and was at all times relevant an owner, shareholder, officer, and operator of Mericle Construction, Inc.
68. Mericle Construction, Inc. (“MERICLE CONSTRUCTION”) was, at all times relevant hereto, a close corporation authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a registered office address located at 33 Beekman Street Wilkes- Barre, Pennsylvania.
69. MERICLE CONSTRUCTION was, at all times relevant hereto, a business entity under the control of MERICLE.
70. MERICLE, at all times relevant hereto, used MERICLE CONSTRUCTION to funnel unlawful payments and kickbacks to other defendants as further set forth herein. Upon information and belief, MERICLE personally directed when and to whom the unlawful payments and kickbacks were made.
71. Robert J. Powell (“POWELL”) was, at all times relevant hereto, an attorney authorized to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, sworn to uphold the laws and the
statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and United States of America. POWELL was also, at all times relevant, co-owner and/or operator of PA CHILD CARE and WESTERN PA CHILD CARE. He currently resides in Drums, PA.
72. Gregory Zappala hereinafter (“ZAPPALA”) was, at all times relevant hereto, co-owner and/or operator of PA CHILD CARE and WESTERN PA CHILD CARE. He currently resides in Cranberry Township, PA.
73. Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc. hereinafter (“BEVERAGE MARKETING”) was, at all times relevant hereto, a corporation authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a registered office address of P.O. Box 17, Pottsville Road, Seltzer, Pennsylvania.
74. BEVERAGE MARKETING was, at all times relevant hereto, a business entity under CONAHAN’S control.
75. Vision Holdings Inc., hereinafter (“VISIONS”), is a Cayman Island Company with a principal address in the Cayman Islands that is unknown at this time, but that was owned and operated by POWELL.
76. Joe Doe, Esquire, hereafter (“DOE”), is an unidentified attorney and co-conspirator listed in the Federal Criminal Information filed against defendants CONAHAN and CIAVERELLA in the United States District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
76. Sandra Brulo hereinafter (“BRULO”) was, at all times relevant hereto, the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer of Luzerne County. In that position, BRULO was a policy maker for Luzerne County with respect to matters within the purview of the juvenile probation department.
77. Upon information and belief, all defendants are residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and all individually named defendants are being sued in both their individual and official capacities.





FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 1
The Opening of the PA Child Care Juvenile Detention Facility
and the Closing of Luzerne County’s Juvenile Detention Center

78. At or around June 2000, CIAVARELLA engaged in discussions with POWELL, who was interested in constructing a juvenile detention facility in Luzerne County.
79. At or around June 2000, CIAVARELLA introduced POWELL to MERICLE for the purpose of locating land for the juvenile detention facility and for constructing the facility.
80. POWELL, ZAPPALA, and PA CHILD CARE acquired land in Luzerne County and entered into an agreement with MERICLE to construct a juvenile detention center, which would then be operated by PA CHILD CARE.
81. On or about January 29, 2002, CONAHAN, in his official capacity as President Judge of Luzerne County, signed a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (“THE COURT”), and PA CHILD CARE, to house juvenile offenders at PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facility.
82. Pursuant to the “Placement Guarantee Agreement,” THE COURT would pay PA CHILD CARE an annual rental installment of $1,314,000, and THE COURT’S obligation “shall be absolute and unconditional.”
83. At or around June 2000, CIAVARELLA introduced POWELL to MERICLE for the purpose of locating land for the juvenile detention facility and for constructing the facility.
84. POWELL, ZAPPALA, and PA CHILD CARE acquired land in Luzerne County and entered into an agreement with MERICLE to construct a juvenile detention center, which would be then be operated by PA CHILD CARE.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 The allegations made below concerning the defendants’ scheme are alleged upon information and belief, based on a criminal information entitled United States of America v. Michael T. Conahan and Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., U.S. Dist. Ct., Middle District of Pennsylvania, filed on January 26, 2009. These allegations have been made public record.




85. On or about January 29, 2002, CONAHAN, in his official capacity as President Judge of Luzerne County, signed a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (“THE COURT”), and PA CHILD CARE, to house juvenile offenders at PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facility.
86. Pursuant to the “Placement Guarantee Agreement,” THE COURT would pay PA CHILD CARE an annual rental installment of $1,314,000, and THE COURT’S obligation “shall be absolute and unconditional.”
87. At or around December 2002, CONAHAN, in his official capacity as President Judge of Luzerne County, took official action to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility, then located at in Wilkes-Barre, PA. The Payment, Transfer and Receipt of Bribes
88. At or around January 2003, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA arranged to receive a $997,600 payment in connection with the roles they played as judges in accomplishing the construction of PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facility.
89. CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA arranged to receive this payment through the aid and abetment of MERICLE and POWELL.
90. In order to fraudulently conceal this $997,600 payment, MERICLE and POWELL signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement,” which MERICLE prepared, and MERICLE and POWELL backdated to February 19, 2002, so it would be prior to CONAHAN’S removal of funding for Luzerne County’s juvenile detention center.
100. MERICLE’S and POWELL’S “Registration and Commission Agreement” purported to be an agreement for MERICLE to pay POWELL a broker’s fee of $997,600.
101. However, a large portion of that money was intended to be, and in fact was paid to, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, both of whom engaged in an elaborate series of financial transactions, done over time, with the aid and abetment of MERICLE and POWELL, which was designed to conceal CONAHAN’S and CIAVARELLA’S receipt of this payment.
102. The financial transactions began on or about January 21, 2003, when MERICLE wire transferred $610,000 to another attorney’s trust account, and MERICLE wire transferred $387,600 to a bank account under POWELL’S control.
103. On or about January 28, 2003, the $610,000 in another attorney’s trust account was wire transferred to BEVERAGE MARKETING’S bank account, a business entity under CONAHAN’S control.
104. Thereafter, CONAHAN passed a portion of the $610,000 payment to CIAVARELLA through another series of financial transactions, again designed to fraudulently conceal that the payments were received by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
105. CONAHAN did this on or about January 28, 2003, by directing that $330,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE MARKETING to a bank account controlled by CIAVARELLA.
106. CONAHAN further did this on or about April 30, 2003, by directing that $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE MARKETING to a bank account controlled by CIAVARELLA.
107. CONAHAN further did this on or about July 15, 2003, by directing that $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE MARKETING to a bank account controlled by CIAVARELLA.
108. CONAHAN further did this on or about August 13, 2003, by directing that $25,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE MARKETING to a bank account controlled by a third party.
109. CONAHAN further did this on or about August 20, 2003, by directing that $105,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE MARKETING to a bank account he controlled himself.
110. In so doing, CONAHAN disbursed all but $25,000 of the $610,000 payment, to himself and CIAVARELLA; CONAHAN disbursed the remaining $25,000 to a third party.
111. To fraudulently conceal these payments to CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, CONAHAN directed that false entries be made in the books and records of BEVERAGE MARKETING (the entity which ultimately received the $610,000 wire transfer by MERICLE).
112. As to the remaining $387,600 of the $997,600 payment made pursuant to MERICLE’s and POWELL’S purported “Registration and Commission Agreement,” a portion of that $387,600 payment was made to CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, again through another series of financial transactions, done over time, which were designed to fraudulently conceal that the payments were received by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
113. On or about August 29, 2003, a $326,000 check was drawn on a bank account under POWELL’S control which was then deposited into a bank account maintained in another person’s name, but which account was actually under the control of CONAHAN.

Western PA Child Care
114. Upon information and belief, some time between 2003 and 2005, POWELL, ZAPPALA, and WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, constructed a juvenile detention center facility in Western Pennsylvania.
115. POWELL, ZAPPALA, and WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, employed MERICLE, and MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, to construct WESTERN PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facility.

Additional Payment, Transfer and Receipt of Bribes
116. At or around July 2005, upon completion and construction of the facility, POWELL made a $1,000,000 payment to CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
117. To fraudulently conceal this payment, POWELL made the payment to PINNACLE GROUP, a business entity owned by other persons, but controlled by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, and believed to be under the control of BARBARA CONAHAN and CYNTHIA CIAVARELLA too.
118. In order to fraudulently conceal this $1,000,000 payment, MERICLE and POWELL signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement,” which MERICLE prepared.
119. MERICLE’S and POWELL’S “Registration and Commission Agreement” purported to be an agreement for MERICLE to pay POWELL a broker’s fee of $1,000,000.
120. However, MERICLE wire transferred $1,000,000 from an account of MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, to an account of PINNACLE GROUP, a business entity owned by other persons, but controlled by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, and believed to be under the control of BARBARA CONAHAN and CYNTHIA CIAVARELLA too.




The Addition to the PA Child Care Facility
121. Upon information and belief, some time prior to February 2006, POWELL, ZAPPALA, and PA CHILD CARE constructed an addition to the juvenile detention center facility in Luzerne County.
122. MERICLE, and MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, were employed to complete the expansion project.

Still Further Payments, Transfers and Receipts of Bribes
123. At or around February 2006, upon completion of the expansion project, a $150,000 payment was made to CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
124. To fraudulently conceal the payment, it was made to PINNACLE GROUP, a business entity owned by other persons, but controlled by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, and believed to be under the control of BARBARA CONAHAN and CYNTHIA CIAVARELLA too.
125. In order to conceal this $150,000 payment, MERICLE and POWELL signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement,” which MERICLE prepared.
126. MERICLE and POWELL’S “Registration and Commission Agreement” purported to be an agreement for MERICLE to pay POWELL a broker’s fee of $150,000.
127. However, MERICLE wire transferred $150,000 from an account of MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, to an account of PINNACLE GROUP, a business entity owned by other persons, but controlled by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, and believed to be under the control of BARBARA CONAHAN and CYNTHIA CIAVARELLA too.
128. Upon information and belief, on or about February 3, 2006, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $150,000 to be wire transferred to a PINNACLE GROUP bank account.

The Placement of Juveniles
129. At or around February 2003, after completion of PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facility, CIAVARELLA, in his capacity as a juvenile court judge, began directing that juvenile offenders be sent to that facility.

Still Further Payments, Transfers and Receipts of Bribes
130. Between February 2003 and January 2007, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA received from POWELL hundreds of thousands of dollars in payment for their past and future official actions relating to PA CHILD CARE and WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, and took steps to fraudulently conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership and control of the money POWELL paid them.
131. POWELL made some of these payments from checks drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
132. On or about January 13, 2004, POWELL made an $18,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
133. On or about January 13, 2004, POWELL made a $52,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
134. On or about February 15, 2004, POWELL made a $78,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
135. On or about February 15, 2004, POWELL made a $75,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
136. On or about February 15, 2004, POWELL made a $47,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
137. On or about April 30, 2004, POWELL made a $75,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
138. On or about April 30, 2004, POWELL made a $25,000 payment from a check drawn on one or more bank accounts under his control to PINNACLE GROUP.
139. Upon information and belief, to fraudulently conceal these payments to CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, POWELL made false notations on the checks, and CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA directed that false entries be made in the books and records of PINNACLE GROUP.
140. On or about January 20, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $18,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Rent Prepay.”
141. On or about January 20, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $52,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Rent Marine Prepay.”
142. On or about February 24, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $47,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Slip Rental Fees.”
143. On or about February 24, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $78,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Reserving Lease.”
144. On or about February 24, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $75,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Rental Fb, Mar, Apr.”
145. On or about May 3, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $75,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Lease Expenses April May June.”
146. On or about May 3, 2004, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused $25,000 to be deposited into a PINNACLE GROUP bank account which was falsely characterized as “Dock Expenses Related April May June.”
147. POWELL made some of these payments by wire transfers from one or more bank accounts under his control to an account under the control of PINNACLE GROUP.
148. On or about July 12, 2004, POWELL made a $120,000 wire transfer from an account of VISION HOLDINGS, to an account of PINNACLE GROUP.
149. On or about September 23, 2004, POWELL made a $100,000 wire transfer from an account of VISION HOLDINGS, to an account of PINNACLE GROUP.

Fraud and Fraudulent Concealment
150. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA fraudulently concealed their active participation in the financial transactions outlined above, all of which were designed for their personal financial gain, and for the financial gain of BARBARA CONAHAN, CYNTHIA CIAVARELLA, PINNACLE GROUP, and BEVERAGE MARKETING.
151. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA fraudulently concealed that they engaged in conduct that constituted a conflict of interest in connection with the construction of the juvenile detention facility, the placement of youths thereat, and their receipt of payments in connection therewith.
152. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA fraudulently concealed that they actively engaged in conduct that constituted seeking and accepting improper influence.
153. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA fraudulently failed to recuse themselves from matters in which they had a conflict of interest.
154. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA fraudulently failed to disclose material information affecting their ability to engage in impartial decision-making.
155. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN engaged in a scheme and artifice to defraud by entering into agreements guaranteeing placement of juvenile offenders with PA CHILD CARE, WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, POWELL and ZAPPALA by taking official action to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the Luzerne County juvenile detention center, thereby effectively closing it.
156. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA engaged in a scheme and artifice to defraud by facilitating the construction of juvenile detention facilities in Luzerne County, western Pennsylvania, and an addition in Luzerne County, and directing that juvenile offenders be lodged at juvenile detention facilities operated by PA CHILD CARE, WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, POWELL and ZAPPALA.
157. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA engaged in a scheme and artifice to defraud by facilitating the channeling of millions of dollars for the placement of juvenile offenders to PA CHILD CARE, WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, POWELL and ZAPPALA, including an agreement in late 2004 worth approximately $58,000,000.


The Treatment of Juveniles Including Members of the Class
158. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA engaged in a scheme and artifice to defraud by ordering accused juvenile offenders to be detained-even when juvenile probation offices did not recommend detention.
159. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA, and others operating at his behest, exerted pressure on THE COURT’S staff to recommend detention of juvenile offenders.
160. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA knew that the juveniles would be detained at PA CHILD CARE’S and WESTERN PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facilities.
161. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA engaged in a scheme and artifice to defraud by adopting procedures in juvenile court, including the adoption of “Specialty Court.” He did this through his discretionary decision-making authority.
162. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA knew adopting these procedures would create the potential for an increased number of juvenile offenders to be sent to PA CHILD CARE’S or WESTERN PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facilities, which would thus ensure a high occupancy rate.
163. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA prohibited or discouraged juveniles from having legal representation during court proceedings, thereby creating the potential for an increased number of juvenile offenders to be sent to PA CHILD CARE’S or WESTERN PA CHILD CARE’S juvenile detention facilities.
164. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA prohibited or discouraged juveniles from having legal representation during court proceedings, despite admonition by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that juveniles had the right to legal counsel during court proceedings.
165. BRULO was present, or had a representative from her office present, during all juvenile court proceedings. Upon information and belief, BRULO succumbed to pressure from Ciavarella to ensure that juveniles were placed in juvenile detention facilities and were not released. Further, upon information and belief, BRULO and the personnel under her control determined placements and sentences before juveniles were ever adjudicated to be delinquent, and while under law they enjoyed a constitutional presumption of innocence.
166. BRULO, as Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, created and/or condoned an official policy, practice and/or custom on behalf of Luzerne County’s Juvenile Probation Department, of depriving juveniles accused of wrongdoing of their rights to, among other things: legal counsel during court proceedings; an adjudication of delinquency by an impartial and honest judge, free from conflict of interest and the incentive of personal financial gain by his conduct; an adjudication of placement in a detention facility by an impartial and honest judge, free from conflict of interest and the incentive of personal financial gain by his conduct; imposition of punishment equal to, but not exceeding, the alleged violation; imposition of punishment that would not exceed a sentence imposed against an adult for the same alleged violation; a constitutional presumption of innocence; probation officers who would ensure juveniles were not placed in a detention facility when they did not recommend detention-especially in light of the obvious absence of legal counsel during court proceedings; and probation officers who would ensure or advocate that their recommendations were followed.
153. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CIAVARELLA adopted these special procedures and ordered the placement of accused juvenile offenders to detention facilities, without ever disclosing his fraudulent role in the construction of the juvenile detention facilities, his receipt of payments in connection therewith, his placement of youths thereat, his material conflict of interest, or the exact nature of his financial and other relationships with PA CHILD CARE, WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, MERICLE, POWELL and ZAPPALA.
167. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA were involved in court proceedings without recusing themselves from matters in which they had a material conflict of interest, and without ever disclosing to parties and entities involved their conflict of interest, and their financial and other relationships with PA CHILD CARE, WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, MERICLE, POWELL and ZAPPALA.
168. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA otherwise conducted THE COURT’S affairs, in matters which they had discretionary decision-making authority, without ever disclosing to parties and entities involved their conflict of interest, and their financial and other relationships with PA CHILD CARE, WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, MERICLE, POWELL and ZAPPALA.


CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
169. Each of the plaintiffs who were juveniles and who were placed in PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care was deprived of his or her liberty.
170. Each of the plaintiffs who paid money to house their child in PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care was deprived of his or her property.
171. The deprivations of liberty and/or property described above were conducted without due process of law. Due process of law would have required, among other things, a fair and impartial judge, without a conflict of interest; a judge who had not conspired and guaranteed to place children in PA CHILD CARE; a process wherein a child accused of committing a crime, or of delinquency, was presumed to be innocent unless and until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to counsel; appropriate and lawful waivers of the right to counsel; an entire judicial system that was geared to the best interest and rehabilitation of children deemed to be delinquent.
172. All defendants’ actions, and the policies and customs developed, maintained and implemented by BRULO on behalf of Luzerne County, deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
173. CIAVARELLA’S and CONAHAN’S out-of-court actions, signed and unsigned agreements, and conspiracy, were taken in administrative capacities. Those actions, agreements and conspiracy were designed to, and did in fact; deprive the plaintiffs of the constitutional rights to due process of law.






COUNT ONE
(18 U.S.C. §1961(3) and 1962(a), (b), (c) & (d))
Juvenile Plaintiffs v. All Defendants but Brulo

174. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 173 as if the same were fully set forth herein.
175. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, all defendants but BRULO were “persons” by virtue of being individuals or entities, who held a legal or beneficial interest in property, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(3).
176. All defendants, except BRULO, formed an “enterprise” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4).
177. The defendants, except BRULO, engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5). The pattern of racketeering included violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343.
178. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, all Defendants but BRULO received income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity. These defendants used or invested, directly or indirectly, part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, an enterprise which was engaged in, or the activities of which affected, interstate or foreign commerce, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(a).
179. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, all Defendants but BRULO acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, interest in or control of an enterprise which engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(b).
180. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, all Defendants but BRULO conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec.1962(c).
181. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, all Defendants but BRULO conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(a), (b), and (c), in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d).
182. As a result, Juvenile Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries and damage.

COUNT TWO
(42 U.S.C. §1983)
Procedural Due Process
Juvenile Plaintiffs vs. Conahan and Ciavarella

183. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 182 as if the same were fully set forth herein.
184. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA were acting under color of state law.
185. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
186. CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA therefore deprived Plaintiffs of their procedural Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
187. As a result, Juvenile Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries and damage.

COUNT THREE
(42 U.S.C. §1983)
Substantive Due Process
Juvenile Plaintiffs vs. Conahan and Ciavarella
188. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 187 as if the same were fully set forth herein.
189. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA were acting under color of state law.
190. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to substantive due process.
191. CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA therefore deprived Plaintiffs of their substantive Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
192. As a result, Juvenile Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries and damage.

COUNT FOUR
(42 U.S.C. §1983)
Juvenile Plaintiffs vs. Brulo
193. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 192 as if the same were fully set forth herein.
194. Plaintiffs had a liberty right to be free from unlawful and unnecessary detention.
195. At all times relevant hereto, BRULO was acting under color of state law.
196. At all time relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, BRULO, created and/or condoned an official policy, practice and/or custom on behalf of Luzerne County’s Juvenile Probation Department and Luzerne County, of depriving juveniles accused of wrongdoing of their rights to, among other things: legal counsel during court proceedings; an adjudication of delinquency by an impartial and honest judge, free from conflict of interest and the incentive of personal financial gain by his conduct; an adjudication of placement in a detention facility by an impartial and honest judge, free from conflict of interest and the incentive of personal financial gain by his conduct; imposition of punishment equal to, but not exceeding, the alleged violation; imposition of punishment that would not exceed a sentence imposed against an adult for the same alleged violation; probation officers who would ensure juveniles were not placed in a detention facility when they did not recommend detention--especially in light of the obvious absence of legal counsel during court proceedings; and probation officers who would ensure or advocate that their recommendations were followed.
197. BRULO’S and Luzerne County’s policy, practice and/or custom was a cause of harm to the plaintiffs.
198. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, BRULO engaged in unconstitutional behavior.
199. As a result, Juvenile Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries and damage.

COUNT FIVE
(42 U.S.C. §1983)
Parent Plaintiffs vs. All Defendants

200. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 199 as if the same were fully set forth herein.
201. At all times relevant hereto, and based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff parents were deprived of property, and incurred damages, for the placement, housing and lodging of their children at juvenile detention facilities.
202. Such deprivation of property was without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
203. As a result, Parent Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries and damage.


COUNT SIX
(Civil Conspiracy To Violate 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the U.S. Constitution)
All Plaintiffs vs. Defendants

204. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 204 as if the same were fully set forth herein at length.
205. All Defendants entered into an agreement and combined among themselves and with others to engage in unlawful and unconstitutional conduct, i.e. depriving Plaintiffs of their liberty and property rights, by engaging in the aforesaid conduct.
206. All Defendants engaged in the aforesaid conduct with malice and the intent to injure Plaintiffs.
207. As a result, all Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries and damage.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment as follows:
A. For all Counts, an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest;
B. For Count One (RICO), three fold the damages sustained by each Plaintiff and the cost of suit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec.1964(c).
C. For punitive damages against all defendants except BRULO in her official capacity;
D. For attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1964(a) and 42 U.S.C. Sec.1988;
E. For the costs and disbursements incurred in this action; and
F. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues.

__________________________
Sally Owens of the Law Office of
ANDREW D. STINE, ESQ.
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
120 South Olive Avenue, #402
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Telephone (561) 832-1170
Facsimile (561) 832-1544
e-mail adstine@bellsouth.net
Bar Number:

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Florida Department of Motor Vehicles

The Law office or Andrew D. Stine took on the Department of Motor Vehicles(DMV) in two appellate Cases 502008-CA-007637-XXXXMB and 502008-CA-008011-XXXXMB. The law office of defense attorney Andrew D. Stine took on the Department of Motor Vehicles as the Department was applying the law which was clearly unconstitutional. The Department of Motor Vehicles was unconstitutionally depriving the drivers of Florida, specifically Palm Beach County drivers, of their right to a fair and constitutional hearing after a DUI arrest. Florida law is specific in that after a DUI arrest a driver has 10 days to file for a DMV hearing. The Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officers, according to the law office of Andrew D. Stine, were applying unconstitutional law in that they were not requiring law enforcement officers to have probable cause when stopping motorists in Palm Beach County Florida. Please read the following Petitions for Writ of Certiorari filed in these cases.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY.


Petitioner,
Petitioner,

v.

Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,
Respondent,

_______________________________________/

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pursuant to Fla. R. App. P., 9.100, Petitioner, by and through his undersigned attorney respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Final Order of a Hearing Officer in an administrative proceeding. The Order to be reviewed is an order suspending the Petitioner’s driver’s license. (Appendix A)
I.
BASES FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article V, Section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, F.S. 322.31, and Rule 9.030(b) (2) (A). Further, F. S. 322.2615 (13), specifically states that “a person may appeal any decision of the department sustaining a suspension of his driver’s license by a writ of certiorari to the circuit court.”
II.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Petitioner, requests this Court to grant his petition for writ of certiorari and to reverse the Hearing Officer’s order suspending his driving privileges due to the fact that the Order departed from the essential requirements of law, Petitioner was not afforded due process, and due to the fact that the findings within the order were not based upon substantial competent evidence.
According to the findings of fact, made in the Final Order of License Suspension, Mr. Petitioner was stopped by Sgt. Wright of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office on January 11, 2007 (sic 2008), at approximately 5:00 a.m. due to the fact that he thought he might be impaired. Sgt. Wright then informed Det. Rieger that he observed Petitioner weave back and forth within his lane, that he crossed over the solid white line about 2 tire lengths and that he would fluctuate his speed between 25 and 45 miles per hour. Upon stopping Petitioner, Sgt. Wright states that Petitioner had glassy red eyes, there was strong odor of alcohol and Petitioner’s speech was slurred. Detective Rieger also made these observations. (Appendix A pg. 3). Based upon these observations, Petitioner was subjected to roadside sobriety tests, which the officers believed that he performed poorly. Petitioner was subsequently subjected to a breath test and he provided two breath samples of .154 at 6:02 a.m. and 1.50 at 6:05 a.m. (Appendix A pg. 3). Petitioner was then arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Florida Statute 316.193.
Petitioner requested a Formal Review Hearing from which a Final Order of License Suspension issued on February 19, 2008.
From that Order, this timely petition for writ of certiorari ensues.
III.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Petitioner seeks an Order of this Court granting his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, quashing the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Order upholding the suspension of his driver’s license and ordering that the Petitioner’s driving privileges be reinstated.
IV.
ARGUMENT
The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ Administrative hearing did not satisfy minimum standards of due process. Fla. Const. Art. 1. Sec. 9; U.S. Const. Amendment 14. Petitioner was deprived of due process due to the fact that he was stopped by Sgt. Wright without a legal basis. Therefore, the stop and arrest of Petitioner were unlawful. This court should quash the Final Order of License Suspension and Petitioner’s driving privilege should be reinstated. Holland v. State, 696 So 2d 757 (Fla. 1997).
The finding of facts as stated in the Order reflects that Mr. Petitioner was stopped for weaving back and forth within his lane. Sgt. Wright also advised the Petitioner was crossing over the roadway approximately two tire widths and that his speeds would fluctuate from 20 MPH to 45 MPH. (Appendix A pg. 3).
The officer stopped the vehicle due to the fact that he “believed he was impaired or ill”. The officer conducted roadside test and subsequently the licensee was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and was transported to a breath testing facility. At the facility the licensee was read his implied consent rights and he provided two breath samples with readings of .154 and .150. Licensee was subsequently charged with DUI, failure to maintain a single lane and impeding traffic (driving to slow).
Licensee now moves to set aside the suspension due to the fact that the officer had no legal basis to conduct a stop of licensee’s vehicle, the Hearing Officer failed to consider legal arguments of Petitioner and the Hearing Officer improperly admitted incompetent evidence, specifically the breath card.
It is well established that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures includes investigatory stops of automobiles. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An examination of the validity of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment thus requires courts to determine whether the stop was reasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual, subjective motivations of the individual officers involved in conducting the stop. The Court thus rejected a consideration of whether a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would have initiated the traffic stop, noting that it seems “easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.” Id. at 815, 116 S.Ct. 1769.
In this case the officer articulates facts regarding the driving pattern of Petitioner in that on a few occasions he observed a vehicle vary its speeds and cross a solid white line in the right hand lane. The officer did not articulate or swear to any other facts. Therefore, the officer’s sworn testimony does validate a Constitutional basis for stopping Petitioner.
Florida Statute §316.089(1), provides: “Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith, shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety”.
In Jordan v. State, 831 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine, and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the incriminating evidence. The sole issue presented on appeal was whether the traffic stop of Jordan's vehicle for failure to maintain a single lane was lawful. The court held that §316.089 (failure to maintain a single lane) is not a strict liability infraction; movement from a single lane is permitted when the driver ascertains that the movement can be made safely. In fact the Court stated “The applicable statute in this case recognizes that it is not practicable, perhaps not even possible, for a motorist to maintain a single lane at all times and that the crucial concern is safety rather than precision.” Id at 1243.
In Crooks v. State, 710 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998), the Court held that an arresting deputy sheriff had no objective basis to stop defendant's vehicle, even though deputy observed vehicle drive over right-hand line on edge of right lane of traffic on three occasions, when there was no testimony that suggested that defendant moved any great distance over line into emergency lane and no other cars or pedestrians were near defendant at the time, and there was no testimony that his driving created a safety concern or any suspicion. The facts in this case are almost identical to that in Crook and require a finding that the stop of licensee’s vehicle was illegal.
The citation for impeding traffic is also not a valid basis to stop the licensee’s vehicle. Florida Statue §316.183(5) states that “no person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.” The probable cause affidavit makes no mention that there was any traffic (and quite frankly how much traffic could there have existed at 5:00 am) or that any traffic was impeded.
In Hurd v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1594 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) the court held that Defendant's varied speeds and unwarned sudden lane change did not provide probable cause for traffic stop, where defendant's lane change was done safely, and defendant's driving was not sufficiently erratic to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment. The Court stated that while a traffic stop is permitted without a traffic violation when supported by a reasonable suspicion of impairment, the facts in that case did not support a reasonable belief of impairment. In so much as the facts articulated by the arresting officer do not support a reasonable belief of impairment the suspension must be set aside.
The Hearing Officer was presented with all of the above cases in a motion which was to become an exhibit to be considered by the Department. However, in the final order of suspension, while the Hearing Officer acknowledges the motions having been made, the officer does not indicate that the written motion itself was ever considered. In addition, the final order fails to do include any analysis of the facts set forth in the motion that would distinguish the above cited cases from the instant case. It appears as if the Hearing Officer accepted the motions as a matter of procedure without ever truly considering them. In other words she placed procedure over substance. Clearly this is a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights.
CONLCUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Office departed from the essential requirements of law and due process which requires that the suspension be set aside and vacated and the reinstatement of Petitioner’s driving privileges.
WHEREFORE, the licensee respectfully requests that the suspension be set aside and that his full driving privileges be immediately restored and for such other further relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U. S. Mail to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, to Hearing Officer Odileinis Gibson at 6801 Lake Worth Road, Ste. 230, Lake Worth, Florida 33467 this 18th day of March, 2008.
Respectfully submitted,
s/Andrew D. Stine, Esq.
ANDREW D. STINE, ESQ.
120 South Olive Avenue
Suite 402
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
(561) 832-1170
Fla. Bar No.:
adstine@bellsouth.net

And the second Writ:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY.


Petitioner,

v.

Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,
Respondent,

_______________________________________/

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pursuant to Fla. R. App. P., 9.100, Petitioner, Petitioner, by and through his undersigned attorney respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Final Order of a Hearing Officer in an administrative proceeding. The Order to be reviewed is an order suspending the Petitioner’s driver’s license. (Appendix A)
I.
BASES FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article V, Section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, F.S. 322.31, and Rule 9.030(b) (2) (A). Further, F. S. 322.2615 (13), specifically states that “a person may appeal any decision of the department sustaining a suspension of his driver’s license by a writ of certiorari to the circuit court.”
II.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Petitioner, _________ requests that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari and to reverse the Hearing Officer’s order suspending his driving privileges due to the fact that the Order departed from the essential requirements of law, Petitioner was not afforded due process, and due to the fact that the findings within the order were not based upon substantial competent evidence.
According to the findings of fact (attached as appendix A), made in the Final Order of License Suspension, Officer Rieger was on patrol in a parking lot issuing two traffic citations to a vehicle, when he ran the tag of the vehicle and a warrant came back for the owner of the vehicle. Deputy Rieger waited in the parking lot, to see if he could make contact with the driver of the vehicle, the Deputy then notices the driver get into the vehicle and go. Deputy Rieger followed the vehicle and noticed the driver drift over the solid yellow lane line by the median, then back to the left, and this occurred several times. Deputy Rieger proceeded to conduct a traffic stop for the warrant.
After stopping the vehicle, Deputy Rieger detected a strong smell of odor of unknown alcoholic beverage coming from the driver, Petitioner. The Deputy also noticed that Petitioner’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, his face was flushed and that his clothes were disorderly. Upon Petitioner exiting his automobile, he stumbled, used the patrol car for balance and sat on the bumper of the car. Petitioner was administered road side tests, which were performed poorly.
Petitioner was then transported to a breath testing facility and he gave two samples of his breath with the following readings: (i) .085 at 1:22 a.m. and (ii) .089 at 1:26 a.m.
Petitioner was then arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Florida Statute 316.193.
Petitioner requested a Formal Review Hearing from which a Final Order of License Suspension issued on February 21, 2008. During the Petitioner’s Formal Hearing, the following additional testimony and argument was procured. Objection was made to the breath card, which is marked as document number DDL number 5 of the Department’s exhibit list. The objection was based on authenticity because DDL 5 is a photocopy of the breath card with a signature on the card, which is made with blue ink. The objection to authenticity was made as the information that the Department had regarding DDL 5 shows the breath card was not signed at the time of the sample as a photocopy form was provided with all of the breath information and then signed with a blue ink pen. (pgs. 5-6).
Further, during the hearing a written motion to set aside suspension was filed, and entered into the record. The Department however, does not list it within their record regarding this Petitioner; and the Department does not distinguish in any shape, way or manner the cases presented with the filed, written, argued and articulated motion in their final decision to suspend the Petitioner’s driving privileges.
From that Order, this timely petition for writ of certiorari ensues.

III.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Petitioner seeks an Order of this Court granting his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, quashing the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Order upholding the suspension of his driver’s license and ordering that the Petitioner’s driving privileges be reinstated.
IV.
ARGUMENT
The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ Administrative hearing did not satisfy minimum standards of due process. Fla. Const. Art. 1. Sec. 9; U.S. Const. Amendment 14. Petitioner was deprived of due process due to the fact that he was stopped by Officer Rieger without a legal basis. Therefore, the stop and arrest of Petitioner were unlawful. This court should quash the Final Order of License Suspension and Petitioner’s driving privilege should be reinstated. Holland v. State, 696 So 2d 757 (Fla. 1997).
It is well established that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures includes investigatory stops of automobiles. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An examination of the validity of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment thus requires courts to determine whether the stop was reasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual, subjective motivations of the individual officers involved in conducting the stop. The Court thus rejected a consideration of whether a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would have initiated the traffic stop, noting that it seems “easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.” Id. at 815, 116 S.Ct. 1769.
In this case, the officer articulates facts regarding the driving pattern of Petitioner in that on a few occasions he observed a vehicle drift over the solid yellow line by the median, then back over the left lane. The officer did not articulate or swear to any other facts. Therefore, the officer’s sworn testimony does validate a Constitutional basis for stopping Petitioner.
Florida Statute §316.089(1), Florida Statutes provides: “Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith, shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety”.
In Jordan v. State, 831 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine, and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the incriminating evidence. The sole issue presented on appeal was whether the traffic stop of Jordan's vehicle for failure to maintain a single lane was lawful. The court held that §316.089 (failure to maintain a single lane) is not a strict liability infraction; movement from a single lane is permitted when the driver ascertains that the movement can be made safely. In fact the Court stated “The applicable statute in this case recognizes that it is not practicable, perhaps not even possible, for a motorist to maintain a single lane at all times and that the crucial concern is safety rather than precision.” Id at 1243.
In Crooks v. State, 710 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998), the Court held that an arresting deputy sheriff had no objective basis to stop defendant's vehicle, even though deputy observed vehicle drive over right-hand line on edge of right lane of traffic on three occasions. There was no testimony that suggested that defendant moved any great distance over the line into the emergency lane and no other cars or pedestrians were near defendant at the time, and there was no testimony that his driving created a safety concern or any suspicion. The facts in this case are almost identical to that in Crook and require a finding that the stop of licensee’s vehicle was illegal.
In Hurd v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1594 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) the court held that Defendant's varied speeds and unwarned sudden lane change did not provide probable cause for traffic stop, where defendant's lane change was done safely, and defendant's driving was not sufficiently erratic to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment. The Court stated that while a traffic stop is permitted without a traffic violation when supported by a reasonable suspicion of impairment, the facts in that case did not support a reasonable belief of impairment. In so much as the facts articulated by the arresting officer do not support a reasonable belief of impairment the suspension must be set aside.
Likewise the officer had no right to stop the vehicle based upon the warrant. The deputy did not articulate that he was stopping the vehicle and apprehending the driver for a “warrant.” In fact the deputy does not affirm to any of the following facts concerning the warrant: (1) the named individual; (2) the description of the person; (3) gender; (4) age; (5) race; (6) hair color; (7) eye color and (8) any features of the person whom the warrant was issued for were provided. Therefore, the argument, if any, that the stop was premised on a warrant for someone is without merit.
Here the deputy did not determine that the driver of the vehicle was the owner of the vehicle for which a warrant was issued. There is not one scintilla of evidence, as the sworn probable cause affidavit is void, as to the driver and the owner being one and the same person. See State v. Phelps, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. Fla. (6th Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2005) wherein the court held that there is no probable cause to stop a vehicle for the suspicion of a warrant, when it was ascertained that the driver is not the person for whom the warrant was issued.
At bar, it is axiomatic that this deputy did not ascertain who the warrant was for in that he did not swear to it in his probable cause affidavit. As in Phelps, Id., and here even more egregious is the fact that this deputy did ascertain who the warrant was issued for, but made an investigatory stop premised on a lack of information due to incompetence or plain laziness. Whatever the reasons, without reasonable suspicion the result cannot change, meaning the Constitution cannot tolerate these types of illegal stops of its citizens.
Additionally, as to the twenty minute observation period, it is credulous to believe that the 20 minute observation period was properly adhered to in this matter as the form was pre-typed before the driver was ever arrested. Current regulations provide, “the breath test operator, agency inspector, arresting officer, or person designated by the permit holder shall reasonably ensure that the subject has not taken anything by mouth or has not regurgitated for at least twenty (20) minutes before administering the test.” 11D-8.007(3), F.A.C. Additionally, The State has the burden of proving substantial compliance with this regulation. Id.
Here, because the form was prepared prior to the driver ever being arrested it is impossible to know whether substantial compliance with the rule ever took place. Petitioner also points argues that the signature of the breath card in blue ink, adds more credence to the argument that the 20 minute observation period was not properly adhered too. In essence, this Honorable Court is left speculating as to whether or not compliance was met. This type of speculation cannot stand.
Moreover, the Department overruled Petitioner’s objection of authenticity to the aforementioned document, DDL 5, and such objection is an abuse of discretion.

ABUSE OF DISCRETION ARGUMENT.
The Hearing Officer was presented with all of the above cases in a motion which was to become an exhibit to be considered by the Department. However, in the final order of suspension, while the Hearing Officer acknowledges the motions having been made, does not indicate that the written motion itself was ever considered. In addition, the final order fails to do include any analysis of the facts or set forth in the motion that would distinguish the above cited cases from the instant case. It appears as if the Hearing Officer accepted the motions as a matter of procedure without ever truly considering them. In other words she placed procedure over substance. Clearly this is a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights.
The Hearing Officer also placed procedure over substance when she accepted a signed breath card by the arresting officer almost a month after the sample was actually provided. The arrest affidavit is written in handwriting, except for the statement that the arresting officer observed the driver for 20 minutes prior to the driver providing a breath sample. In other words it is pre-printed form that states that a requirement for the admissibility of the breath test results has occurred, when in fact the actual act has not yet occurred. In this case, the arresting officer did not state under oath that he observed the Petitioner for 20 minutes before the breath test until the day before the hearing. This was evidenced by the discovery provided by the State Attorney’s Office which was provided before the hearing and included an unsigned breath card. The signed breath card was provided to Petitioner fort he first time on the day of hearing. Aside from violating the rule that the document be provided to the department within ten days, it is also in accurate which indicates that an event occurred on a certain date when obviously it did not. Despite this major discrepancy, the Hearing Officer accepted the breath card as competent evidence contrary to the requirements of law and to the mandates of due process.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Office departed from the essential requirements of law and due process which requires that the suspension be set aside and vacated and the reinstatement of Petitioner’s driving privileges.
WHEREFORE, the licensee respectfully requests that the suspension be set aside and that his full driving privileges be immediately restored and for such other further relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper.






CONLCUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Office departed from the essential requirements of law and due process which requires that the suspension be set aside and vacated and the reinstatement of Petitioner’s driving privileges.

WHEREFORE, the licensee respectfully requests that the suspension be set aside and that his full driving privileges be immediately restored and for such other further relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper.

Vehicular Homicide

• Facts: In a Martin County Felony Criminal Traffic Homicide Case, Case Number 04-773-CF-MA, the defendant, a Mexican National, was traveling northbound on I-95 in the Hobe Sound area. The testimony showed that the defendant was travelling above the speed limit on a rained slick road. Due to the speed of the car coupled with bad weather conditions, the defendant's car hydroplaned, and crossed the median of I-95. The defendant's vehicle then began to travel north bound on I-95 in the South bound lanes into oncoming traffic. The defendant's vehicle struck another vehicle causing a violent car acident in Martin County, Florida. The driver of the southbound vehicle was killed instantly in the traffic accident. The defendant was arrested and charged with Vehicular Homicide. Because the defendant was an illegal, he was held no bond.
  
• Defense: Defense attorney Andrew D. Stine of West Palm Beach, Florida and his team conducted an evaluation of all evidence. After combing through all of the State's evidence, Attorney Andrew D. Stine began to realize the defendnat was falsely arrested and being illegally held. Attorney Stine filed several motions, including a Violation of Miranda and an Accident Report Privilege. With several motions pending before the Honorable Judge Larry Shack, the State of Florida decided to Nolle Pros the case. All charges were dropped and the defendant was immediately released from custody from the Martin County Jail.

Lewd and Lascivious Battery

• Facts: In Palm Beach County Felony Case Number 2004-CF-010535 AXX the defendant was charged with Lewd and Lascivious Battery. It was charged that the defendant committed Lewd and Lascivious molestation on a child, it was alleged that he touched a young girl inappropriately without intent to commit rape. It was also alleged that the defendant penetrated the alleged victim with his penis and or fingers.
• Defense: Defense attorney Andrew Stine aggressively prepared a defense in this case. Witnesses were brought in to testify. This sounds easy but the witnesses were from Honduras, and were illegal. Therefore, Attorney Stine had to summon the help of the Honduran consulate and required a court order to bring the witness into the court to testify. The witnesses’ testimony refuted the allegations and the case was Nolle-Prossed. The result of this case was the State dropping all charges.

Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon

• Facts: In Palm Beach County Felony Case Number 2008-CF-002479 AMB the defendant was charged with Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon. The defendant used his vehicle on Southern Blvd. in Palm Beach County, to run into the vehicle of the victim Mr. George. The defendant's actions of using his monster truck as a weapon to ram the victim's vehicle on several occassions, over the distance of 4 miles, caused head injuries to the victim and totally destroyed his $130,000.00 Mercedes. Because of the evidence against the defendant, including a full confession, several eye witnesses and a destroyed vehicle with paint marking matching the impounded monster truck, the State charged that the defendant intentionally and repeatedly struck Mr. George against his will, and in doing so used a motor vehicle as a Deadly Weapon in this Palm Beach County, Florida criminal felony case. The defendant in this case was a former State Trooper, CIA Agent and U.S. Army Solider. Actually, the facts showed that the defendant used the PITT maneuver to finally stop the victim's car, before the defendant backed his monster truck on top of it reducing it to a pile of scrap. The State was asking for the bottom of the guidelines, under the Florida Sentencing Punishment Code, which was more than 3 years in the department of corrections. Attorney Andrew D. Stine and his team began the case with the theory of defense that the defendant was in acting in defense of others, and that the victim was actually at fault.
• Defense: Defense attorney Andrew D. Stine aggressively prepared a defense in this case, defense of others, motions were filed, depositions were taken, the investigation was finished. The outome of the case, the State of Florida agreed to drop the Aggravated Battery Charges. The defendant was given probation with no felony conviction on his record. Adjudication was withheld and this once seemingly hopeless case turned on the preparation of the team of Attorney Andrew D. Stine.

Illegal Alien

Local Police seek witness who was deported
Cesar Ariel Jacquez, set to offer key testimony in a homicide case, was sent back to the Dominican Republic by the Federal Government or Homeland Security.
Local Police in Luzerne County, located in Northeastern Pennsylvania, will be in the Dominican Republic next week trying to find a key witness in a homicide case; a prosecutor said Friday. Luzerne County prosecutors learned three weeks ago that the witness, Cesar Ariel Jacquez, had been deported by the Federal Government as he was an illegal alien.
Every defense attorney and prosecutor knows that without the witness, whether his testimony is exculpatory tending to prove innocence or inculpatory tending to show guilt, the case becomes weak. Now the point of this article and blog is to demonstrate the power of the government. (andrewstine.com)
The awesome power of the government and the ability it has to spend our money is shown within this article. First, very few criminal defendants have the resources to compete with the government, when it comes to a criminal proceeding. Remember, each and every law enforcement personnel (cop sheriff), every secretary, every record custodian, every investigator, every vehicle, every machine, and every prosecutor is paid with unlimited resources; tax payers’ funds. Now, factor in what power the state has to bring back a witness, which the federal government has adjudicated as being illegal to our United States. (andrewstine.com)
If I went through ever step of how a regular citizen, like a criminal defendant, goes to get an illegal alien back into the United States, I would be able to build Jacob’s Ladder. I must tell all of up front, it very rarely happens. First, a criminal defense attorney cannot get an order from a State Judge telling the Federal Government what to do. Remember civics class, Separation of Powers. I throw the idea of civics class into the article because I am always at awe, when jurors cannot remember or under stand the Presumption of Innocence. That is for a different article. I mean a State Judge will not even entertain the idea of telling the Feds what to do. Secondly, try to go to a federal judge to get an order to Home Land Security to bring back an Illegal Alien because that person can set your client free. Yeah, that gets you far. (andrewstine.com) See the problem. The defendant without the resources and intergovernmental string-pulling cannot get the witness back in to testify without breaking his or her back.
Wow wish it was as easy as sending two investigators via airplane to a foreign country, renting them an automobile to drive around in, giving them spending money for hotels, food, and entertainment, providing them with a translator, and then allowing them to bring back the witness to testify. In a perfect world that is the way it occurs, unless you are the Government, then it is your world. (andrewstine.com) I am fully aware of this problem as The Law Office of Andrew D. Stine (andrewstine.com) represented a Human Trafficking Case in South Florida that began in the State courts and then went Federal. To fully appreciate what a criminal defense attorney goes through, the ones who care and give a shit, call my legal assistant or speak to my wife about the endless nights of trying to figure out a solution to this problem. I can tell you this, it was not as easy as making a telephone call to my supervisor, but I did pray a lot, and asking him or her to get a witness back into the United States for the benefit of the case. (andrewstine.com).