US SUPREME COURT RULING SENTENCING
In striking down California's sentencing law yesterday which allowed judges, as opposed to juries, to determine aggravating factors warranting an increase in a criminal sentence, the Supreme Court further solidified the principles it began with its Apprendi, Blakely and Booker decisions.
First, the prior cases in a nutshell:
Apprendi invalidated New Jersey’s hate-crime statute, which gave judges the power to make the specific factual findings that converted an ordinary crime into a hate crime, with an enhanced sentence. The court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury gave that role to juries. Meaning that a jury and not the judge has to determine if the defendant acted with the intent towards a certain person because of race or religion as examples.
....Blakely v. Washington.... invalidated Washington’s sentencing guidelines for giving judges the power to impose sentences beyond the normal range based on specific findings about the defendant’s conduct.
Then came Booker in United States v. Booker, the court applied that reasoning to the federal sentencing guidelines, ruling that the guidelines could be deemed constitutional only if they were regarded as “advisory” rather than mandatory. No mandatory sentences.
Yesterday's opinion was written by Justice Ruth Ginsberg. Joining her were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas and Souter.
Dissenting: Justices Alito, Breyer and Kennedy.
As to the California law the Court ruled invalid:
The 1977 law adopted what is known as a determinate-sentencing approach. Each crime carried three possible sentences. The middle sentence was presumed to be the correct one unless the judge made findings that justified the higher or lower alternatives.
Since I practice primarily in federal court, I'm going to be more interested in a case argued next month:
Next month in Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754, the court will hear arguments on whether a federal sentence within the guidelines range should be presumed to be reasonable.
If the court rules against the reasonableness presumption, judges will have even more latitude to impose a non-guideline sentence. The guidelines took effect in 1987. I've had ten years of cases pre-guidelines and 20 post-guidelines, and I have to say, I prefer non-guideline sentences. There's something about determining a person's future by mathematical calculation that just doesn't sit right with me.
While crimes may be the same, those who commit them are not. Simply dividing them, as the Guidelines mandate, into levels one through six based on their criminal history is very de-humanizing and takes away the Judge's ability to impose a sentence based not only on the seriousness of the offense but the character and history of the offender.
FLORIDA
As a Florida Criminal Defense lawyer we are stuck with the Criminal Punishment Code, which is how defendants are primarily sentenced. See Fla. R. Crim. Pro. 3.740 and 3.992. The above Federal Cases only affected a few of the Florida areas: Apprendi and Blakely affected upward departures in Florida Sentencing beyond the presumptive range under the guidelines, and beyond the statutory maximum under the Criminal Punishment Code. Thus, when the defendant’s sentence was increased because of a prior conviction, as described exactly akin to the prior sentence, the prior conviction must be submitted to the jury and be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the State before the sentence could be enhanced. NO LONGER would a Judge find this as a matter of law at the conclusion of a trial.
Apprendi and Blakely have no affect on Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. See Spencer v. State, 842 So2d. 52 (Fla. 2003); Prison Release Reoffender (PRR) is also unaffected. See Robinson v. State, 793 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2001); Habitual Offender (HO) sentence is not within Apprendi and Blakely. See McBride v. State, 884 so. 2d 476 (4th DCA 2004).
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